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The collection Revisiting Gramsci’s Notebooks (Leiden: Brill, 2020) 
edited by Francesca Antonini, Aaron Bernstein, Lorenzo Fusaro 
and Robert Jackson includes contributions from some of the most 
esteemed Gramscian scholars worldwide. The volume is composed 
of eight parts, divided by themes, for a total of 25 chapters. More 
so than any other edited volume, this book originates from years of 
engagement with Gramsci’s oeuvre and with the possible application 
of his thought to contemporary issues. In fact, all contributions 
spring from (and relate to) the long-term study and employment of 
Gramsci’s thought by the different authors. There is thus no doubt 
that the essays contained in this volume will provoke extended 
debates among Gramscian scholars in the years to come.  
As a testament to the incredible reach and breadth of Gramsci’s 
intellectual achievements, the variety of contributions included in 
the volume is extremely vast and could interest scholars involved in 
almost all fields of social sciences. A brief account of the themes 
analysed is in order. The first section is entitled Global Gramsci: 
Gramscian Geographies and describes Gramsci as a geographical 
thinker (Loftus), while also developing specific case studies in the 
political economy of Egypt (Roccu) and Thailand (Buddharaksa). 
Language and Translation emphasizes the contribution of the Italian 
thinker in the study of language also connecting these reflections to 
key political underpinnings (Boothman and Sućeska), whilst 
Wróblewska provides an interesting analysis of Gramsci’s texts 
employing his own approach to translatability. The section Gramsci 
and the Marxian Legacy digs deep into the relation between Gramsci 
and Marxism (and Marx more specifically), in order to address the 
theme of revolution (Frosini), the originality of the philosophy of 
praxis (Bernstein) and the use of historical analogy (Antonini). 
Subalternity between Pre-Modernity and Modernity provides new insights 
regarding Gramsci’s concept of subalternity (Thomas and 
Freeland), whilst also applying it to contemporary issues of space 
and migration (Meret). The theme of subalternity also permeates 
 
 





the fifth section (Postcolonial and Anthropological Approaches) and is 
used to reinterpret Gramsci’s Southern Question (Conelli) as well as 
Edward Said Orientalism (Vandeviver), while Ciavolella emphasizes 
the role of anthropology in Gramsci’s development of the idea of 
‘popular politics’. The sixth part, Culture, Ideology, Religion touches 
upon different themes, from Gramsci’s approach towards the 
Catholic Church (Chino), to his interest in literature (Pohn-
Lauggas), to the analysis of the concept of the ‘mummification of 
culture’ as used in the Prison Notebooks (Jackson). Historical Capitalism 
and World History, uncovers Gramsci’s thought in regards to key 
events in political economy: the passage from feudalism to 
capitalism (Douet), Fordism (Settis) and, more generally, to the role 
of the state in international relations (Fusaro). The last section, 
Readings of Gramsci, deals with different interpretations of Gramsci 
that have been offered in the 20th century in Italy (Panichi), France 
(Crézégut and Neubauer) and Latin America (Cuppi). 
As a whole, the collection speaks to the liveliness of Gramsci’s 
thought as well as to the extended variety of applications that it can 
have in helping us understanding our own present. As argued by 
Anne Showstack Sassoon in the foreword, “Gramsci invites us to 
work with the material to understand better the difficult questions 
of our own times and to seek innovative responses” (p. xii). In this 
sense, the theme selected as a guideline for the collection, “past and 
present”, is extremely apt and summarizes more broadly the ways in 
which we should approach a thinker such as Gramsci, always 
reflecting on how he can help us better understand the present and 
act in it. In terms of methodology, the volume is valuable for the 
reliance that all authors show on the original texts, particularly 
coming from the Prison Notebooks but also from the letters and from 
the pre-prison writings. In this sense, to be extremely appreciated is 
the deep familiarity with Gramsci’s writings that all authors display, 
even when working on specific empirical cases (see, for example, 
the chapters written by Roberto Roccu, Susi Meret and Lorenzo 
Fusaro). 
A complete critical account of such a vast and nuanced array of 
projects would require much more space than the one that I 
possess here. In addition, a task that would be very much worth 
undertaking, but which can find no substantial space in this essay 
review is to integrate the chapters included in the volume within the 
 
 





analysis of the long-term engagement of the authors with Gramsci’s 
thought. For reasons of space, here much more selectivity will be 
needed. I shall argue that one of the key contributions of the 
collection as a whole is to point to Gramsci’s continuous struggle to 
lift people out of subalternity. This is obviously more explicit in 
certain essays than in others. Yet, a key feature of the whole value is 
that the authors emphasize, even when treating the aspects of 
Gramsci’s thought that are not strictly related to political struggles, 
the ways in which the Italian thinker was always concerned about 
the possibility of future emancipation. Although this is a recognized 
feature of Gramsci’s thought, the ways in which the authors 
develop this argument at various points in the collection is 
particularly original and thought-provoking and could be of interest 
for scholars working on broader fields within Marxism and critical 
theory. In particular, the authors seem to repeatedly stress the fact 
that the need for the subaltern groups to free themselves is not only 
a normative stance, but also crucially one that has to do with the 
understanding of the social world. In fact, they highlight not only 
the need to build a collective project capable of lifting people out of 
subalternity, but in turn identify the absence of such a project as the 
main reason for capitalist continuity. However, in the second 
section, I draw attention to how within the collection one finds at 
least as many instances in which the authors seem to contradict the 
previous insights. The lack of a more coherent theorization, I shall 
argue, also explains some of the discrepancies that can be found 
between theoretical accounts and their application to empirical 
cases. Thirdly, I will briefly refer to a possible way out of such 
conundrum by relying on some of the insights that the authors give 
in their contributions, but which seem to be still under-developed 
both in this collection and in Gramscian scholarship more broadly.  
 
 
2. The present we have created: on Gramsci revolutionary thought 
Among the central features of the collection is the 
acknowledgement that Gramsci’s thought is mainly concerned with 
the creation of a revolutionary project. This is true not only for the 
sections of his thought that deal with the need to create what he 
calls a Modern Prince, but actually permeates all sides of his 
theoretical elaboration, as well emphasized by all the contributions 
 
 





in the volume. Fabio Frosini (p. 125) evocatively argues that “for 
Gramsci ‘past’ and ‘present’ coincide respectively with ‘history’ and 
‘politics’” and, going into further detail, he observes that the 
present is supposed to represent the criticism and supersession of 
the past. In Gramsci’s own words, “we must be more adherent to 
the present, which we ourselves have contributed to creating, 
having consciousness of the past and its continuation (and 
reliving)” (Q1§156, p. 136 [cf. PN Vol. 1, p. 234]: cited on p. 133).1  
Implicitly or explicitly following such an approach, practically all 
contributions focus their attention on the ways in which Gramsci’s 
thought invites the subaltern classes to develop alternative forms of 
society. Alex Loftus, for example, focusses a non-determinist 
reading of Gramsci’s approach to geography (p. 12). In his words, 
Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis pays attention to the ways in which 
“social groups make histories and geographies, albeit not under 
conditions of their own choosing” (p. 21). This ultimately pushes us 
to explore, for example, “the manner in which the transformation 
of the city-country relationship might become part of the struggle 
for communist hegemony” (p. 13). Susi Meret, perhaps with an 
overstatement, argues that Gramsci “was the first to show interest 
in the way the subaltern classes had organized throughout history in 
the fight to emancipate themselves from their oppressors” (p. 210). 
She insists that his “political and social experiences prompted him 
to study how networks of solidarity and autonomy can generate 
locally and eventually spark transversal alliances between groups of 
subalterns with a collective aim: to transform society” (p. 210). 
Francesca Antonini, in the chapter that – together with the one 
written by Ingo Pohn-Lauggas – more explicitly focuses on the 
relation between past and present, reminds us that the use of 
historical analogy itself in Gramsci “is essential to […] intervene 
successfully in the political dynamic” (p. 164). The reference to 
Gramsci’s continuous interest in the building of a revolutionary 
project is clear also when the authors engage with parts of his 
thought that are not necessarily linked to political processes. Alen 
Sućeska, for example, acknowledges that Gramsci’s thought about 
language not as a linguist but as a revolutionary (p. 82). Similarly, 
 
1 References to the Prison Notebooks are made according to notebook number (Q), number of 
note (§) and page as in the Italian critical edition. All translations from the Prison Notebooks are 
my own.  
 
 





Derek Boothman reminds us that ideology and language are a 
central part of the creation of collective subjectivities and, 
ultimately, of history itself (p. 67). All these accounts speak to the 
centrality of revolutionary political organizations within Gramsci’s 
thought. As synthesized by Meret, “[t]he unification of the 
struggles, class solidarity and alliances are central themes in 
Gramsci’s writings from the early years of his political activism” (p. 
211). This is not necessarily a novel feature within Gramscian 
scholarship (see Frosini 2010, Ives 2004 and Thomas 2009). Yet, 
given the centrality that it assumes within the collection as well as 
the way in which it is developed, it can definitely be thought-
provoking and perhaps of interest also for scholars working on 
broader fields of Marxism and critical theory.  
In particular, and here comes the most original aspect, at various 
points the authors highlight not only the need to build a collective 
project capable of lifting people out of subalternity; but in turn 
identify the absence of such a project as the main reason for 
capitalist continuity. In other words, Gramsci’s revolutionary 
commitment is not only framed as a normative statement, but most 
crucially as an ontological one. As argued by Nicolas Vandeviver: 
“It is clear from Gramsci’s writings that conscious and wilful 
actions of men are, after all, the prime motors of history” (p. 259). 
Similarly, Riccardo Ciavolella (p. 267) places great emphasis on the 
need for the subaltern classes to become hegemonic and to fight 
those tendencies that bring them to self-defeat (fragmentation, lack 
of cohesive project, passivity, spontaneity). Building on such 
intuition, Takahiro Chino (p. 292) highlights the role of common 
sense as a limited form of thought that must be overcome by good 
sense. This ultimately shows not only how a collective subject is a 
necessary pre-requisite of thorough societal change, but also how 
the lack of such unitary project tends to facilitate capitalist 
continuity.  
Lorenzo Fusaro, though stressing the role that Marx’s laws play 
within the Prison Notebooks, rightly insists that: 
 
What Gramsci seems to elaborate throughout the Prison Notebooks is Marx’s 
idea that epochal change has the potential to occur within the structure only in 
cases in which “men become conscious of this conflict”. By implication, a lack 
in the acquisition of consciousness that occurs at the level of ideologies (hence 
 
 





Gramsci’s interest in ideology, intellectuals, etc.) changes, to put it crudely, 
absolutely nothing. (p. 364) 
 
Fusaro also adds that, differently from Giovanni Arrighi, 
Gramsci believed that hegemony was a precondition for 
domination and not vice versa, and that “once political power has 
been grasped and hence domination attained, the exercise of 
leadership continues to be a condition for its maintenance” (p. 365). 
Perhaps, the most insightful chapter in the collection when it comes 
to the theorization and empirical application of such insights is 
Meret’s study of the refugee-led group Lampedusa in Hamburg 
(LiHH).2 Stressing the fundamental role that consciousness and 
unity play not only in changing subalterns’ condition, but also in 
producing historical change, she writes: 
 
The “degree” of subalternity depends […] on the transformative potential 
and level of “consciousness” experienced by the subalterns through the diverse 
phases of their life experiences. Political subjectivation involves individual and 
collective self-awareness, education, emancipation, political consciousness, self-
organisation, action, and, in particular, it requires the motivation and ability to 
act collectively. The struggle for emancipation can be seen as a radical and 
transformative process, starting from individual awareness and eventually 
developing into collective political acts of antagonism and autonomy (p. 211). 
 
This is not a mere normative stance, but it is rather part of the 
realization that, “[f]or Gramsci, the only way to achieve social change was 
by encouraging and supporting an intellectually autonomous, 
educated, self-empowered, strong and cohesive working class 
movement” (p. 215; my emphasis).  
The contribution that such insights could have within both 
Gramscian and Marxist debates should not be underestimated. In 
fact, whilst we have assisted in recent years to a proliferation of 
debates that place the emphasis on coercive or economic 
mechanisms as the ultimate explanatory tool to understand changes 
and stability within capitalism (see, for example, Bonefeld 2017, 
Bruff 2014, Harvey 2005 and Streek 2017), the authors seem to 
point towards a rather different direction. The coercive aspects 
 
2 The LiHH is a movement created in 2013 in Hamburg, by refugees who had escaped war-
torn Libya. Their main claims were the right to stay, educate themselves, work and be able to 
freely move within the European Union. 
 
 





linked to capitalist development and ruling classes’ dominance are 
not negated; yet, they are often linked to the relative weakness and 
fragmentation of popular classes. At various points, the collection 
seems to emphasize how the use of force is interpreted in Gramsci 
as something that is rendered possible by hegemony and consent, 
and thus is always potentially contestable. Crucial in this regard 
appears Peter Thomas’ contribution to the understanding of 
subalterns as “unable, qua subaltern social groups, to assume the 
self-directive and directing capacities embodied in the form of the 
political” (p. 188). As Gramsci argues, “the subaltern classes, by 
definition, are not unified and cannot unify themselves until they 
become the ‘state’” (Q25§5, p. 2288 [cf. SPN p. 52]: cited on p. 
188). Thomas is even more explicit as he writes that: 
 
Were there no degrees of subalternity, were civil society a terrain of total 
domination rather than a continually renewed hegemonic relation of 
subordination, hegemony, as the emergence of capacities for self-direction and 
leadership of previously subaltern social groups, would not be a realistic 
political strategy (p. 190).  
 
Subalternity is thus understood as a deeply dialectical relation, 
not imposed coercively on the weaker sections of the population, 
but rather as a key element, that itself sustain ruling classes’ 
dominance and, in turn, makes it potentially fragile. This implies 
that the absence of organized revolutionary stances can be seen as 
the primary reason for capitalist continuity; and one that in turn 
allows the use of coercive mechanisms to counter fragmented and 
episodic resistance.  
In sum, the authors seem to recognize something that is often 
underappreciated by contemporary critical scholars, that is that the 
position of subalternity should not be understood as a mere result 
of capitalist accumulation and coercive apparatuses; but rather as a 
pre-requisite that renders these forms of domination possible and 
therefore deeply contestable. As I will show in the next section, 
however, this element – though often stressed – almost never leads 
to a coherent formulation of Gramsci’s theory of changes and 
stability within capitalism. This lack of elaboration can also explain 
why one finds at least as many instances in which the authors seem 









3. ‘We good subalterns’: between ‘positive alterity’ and ‘absolute exteriority’?3 
As we have seen, the Gramsci that comes out at various points in 
the collection is a thinker that not only emphasizes the need to 
build alternative hegemonic projects in order to seize the state and 
produce revolutionary stances; but, conversely, understands the lack 
of such organic projects (in the forms of subalternity, passivity, 
common sense, etc.) as the central reason that allows capital’s 
continuity. This approach is of the upmost importance, given the 
current proliferation of studies within critical theory that tend to 
emphasize coercive mechanisms as key features that at various 
levels impede change to emerge.  
This novel aspect, however, is counter-balanced by several 
instances in which the authors appear to slide away from the 
previous theoretical insights. The passage between common sense 
and good sense, for example, is understood as crucial in Sućeska’s 
chapter in order to contest ruling hegemony. In fact, he is extremely 
precise in identifying the riddle that Gramsci attempts to solve, as 
he points out that whilst the subalterns’ “unification would be the 
beginning of the end of their subalternity, they uphold a form of 
consciousness which is in contradiction with those social facts and, 
what is perhaps most significant, they appear to do so willingly” (p. 
90). Yet, in expressing the reasons that maintain common sense as 
well as “a dominant mode of thought among the masses” (p. 90), 
he mentions “the institutions of the hegemonic apparatus + the 
practices of traditional intellectuals” (p. 92). Sućeska argues that 
“[t]his is a much more ‘productive’ conception compared to that of 
‘false consciousness’, both in the theoretical and the political sense, 
as it both directs us towards revolutionary potential in the masses, 
and, at the same time, allows us to understand how such potential is 
being repressed” (p. 92; my emphasis). In pointing out the ways in 
which social change is always potentially stifled, Sućeska ultimately 
undermines his own remark on the role played by the passive 
attitude of the subordinated classes in accepting external forms of 
consciousness (p. 91).  
To put it bluntly, if the hegemonic apparatus and traditional 
intellectuals are always capable of repressing masses potential, it is 
 
3 Some of the arguments presented in this and the next section have been more thoroughly 
developed in regards to the wider neo-Gramscian literature in Fifi 2019.  
 
 





not true that the unification of subordinated classes would be “the 
beginning of the end of their subalternity”. More in general, what 
appears to be missing is a theory that connects social reproduction 
with people’s lack of organization and theoretical coherence. Anne 
Freeland seems to remark on this point perfectly, as she discusses 
subaltern studies: 
 
Along with the notion that subaltern studies exaggerates the capacity for 
autonomy on the part of subaltern groups, there is, and for related reasons, 
although in reference to its later period, a more common, opposite contention 
that subaltern studies goes too far in denying subaltern agency. The link 
between the two tendencies lies in the separation of subalternity from the hegemonic 
order, first as a positive alterity, and then as an absolute exteriority silenced by its 
discursive incommensurability and therefore conceivable only in negative 
terms […] (p. 201; my emphasis). 
 
This formulation is of crucial value, as it points to the fallacy of 
thinking subalterns’ praxis as fundamentally disjointed from ruling 
bloc’s hegemony. Separating the two processes, as some authors 
seem to do, leaves us without a theory that can link capitalist 
development and continuity with its potentially contested nature. 
The exact note on which Sućeska’s chapter rely most heavily 
(Q11§12) can in fact be used to discredit his approach. Gramsci 
argues that the ‘contrast between thought and action’ of a certain 
social group signifies that the social group in question acts only 
partially as an organic totality, while often passively follows 
conceptions that are not its own (Q11§12, p. 1378-9; SPN p. 326). 
He also insists that the idea that ‘every man is a philosopher’ must 
lead us towards a 
 
second moment, the moment of critique and consciousness, hence to 
the question: is it preferable to ‘think’ without having critical 
consciousness, in a disjointed and occasional manner, thus to 
“participate” in a conception of the world mechanically “imposed” by 
the external environment, […] or is it preferable to elaborate one’s own 
conception of the world consciously and critically and thus, in 
connection with such working of one’s own brain, choose one’s own 
sphere of activity, actively participate in the production of the history of 
the world, being one’s own guide and not passively and supinely accept 
from the outside the imprint to one’s own personality? (Q11§12, pp. 









Gramsci here explicitly links uncritical consciousness with the 
‘imposition’ of external ideas and practices. This, in turn, highlights 
how the development of a critical collective project also equates to 
a challenge to oppressive structures and to the active participation 
in the “production of the history of the world”. On the contrary, if 
the passage from common sense to good sense is always potentially 
impeded by coercion, the critical/uncritical thinking of the 
subalterns would play little role in determining their emancipation.  
The same ambivalence that we find in Sućeska, can also be 
detected in Robert Jackson’s chapter. Discussing what he calls the 
“mummification of culture” – hence “the embalming process 
through which cultural formations that are valuable and appropriate 
when created become fossilized and anachronistic when repeated in 
new conditions”(p. 313) – Jackson emphasizes that this is the result 
of a double movement. On the one hand, “mummification from 
above” coinciding with the attempts of the ruling classes to 
“interrupt any development towards coherence of the traces of 
autonomous action by the subaltern groups” (p. 313). On the other 
hand, “mummification from below”, which “manifests itself in the 
‘intellectual laziness’ that Gramsci connects with the phenomenon 
of ‘Lorianism’, the ‘lack of critical spirit’ that characterizes certain 
intellectuals who rely on a quasi-scientific sociology” (p. 313). 
Jackson is very precise in identifying mummification as reappearing 
in different forms, but crucially as part of the same phenomenon 
(pp. 319-331): the conformism associated with Americanism, 
Taylorism and Fordism, bureaucratic tendencies, Italian cultural 
developments and the Catholic Church’s conservatism, only to 
name a few. He also gives a very balanced account of how 
mummification asserts itself historically: 
 
One conditions the other: the ‘mental laziness’ of Lorianism has been 
fomented by the dispersion wrought by the dominant groups, while the 
mummification of culture is able to achieve purchase on the life of the nation 
for as long as the subaltern groups are unable to develop a more coherent 
leadership (p. 332). 
 
Elsewhere, however, he seems to treat mummification from 
above and mummification from below as if they were separate 
phenomena. This is testified by the fact that Jackson adds that the 
former “forms a part of the complex puzzle by which the dominant 
 
 





social forces are able to obstruct the healthy development of new 
historical and political initiatives” (p. 332). Conversely, “de-
mummification of culture is a condition for the healthy 
development of historical initiative, described by Gramsci in terms 
of a cathartic movement. In this process, the subaltern groups pass 
from their position as an ‘object’ in history to become a 
protagonist, or the authors of a new historical epoch” (p. 333). 
Framing the issue in these terms, Jackson provides us with no clear 
theory regarding the ways in which mummification from below 
(that is passivity, common sense etc.) is connected to the possibility 
of the ruling classes to reproduce mummified forms from above 
(e.g. bureaucracy). In fact, to use Freeland’s terminology, subaltern 
groups are first seen as ‘absolute exteriority’ that, even when 
organized to produce healthy social developments, can always be 
obstructed by dominant social forces. In the second instance, they 
are conceptualized as a “positive alterity” that can magically go 
from having no agency to being the “authors of a new historical 
epoch”.  
The way out of this impasse, once again, can be found in 
Gramsci, and particularly in his understanding of bureaucracy as 
always dependent on the passivity or lack of cultural elaboration of 
the base. In fact, he criticizes the very dualism that does not 
recognize the connection between the individual and the socio-
political organisms she is part of. In Gramsci’s words: 
 
One is brought to think the relations between the individual and the 
organism as a dualism, and to an external critical attitude of the individual 
towards the organism (when the attitude is not of a-critical enthusiastic 
admiration). In any case, a fetishistic relation. The individual waits that the 
organism acts, even if she does not operate and does not reflect about the fact 
that, being her attitude very widespread, the organism is necessarily inactive. 
Furthermore, it is to be recognized that, being widespread a deterministic and 
mechanistic conception of history (conception that is of common sense and is 
linked to the passivity of the great popular masses), every individual, seeing 
that, despite her lack of intervention, something still happens, she is brought to 
think that in fact above the individuals it exists a phantasmagorical entity, the 
abstraction of the collective organism, a kind of autonomous divinity, that does 
not think with any concrete brain, but still thinks, that does not move with 










Gramsci does not negate the existence of bureaucracy, he rather 
negates the possibility that bureaucracy (or mummified 
organizations, to use Jackson’s language) can be kept in place by the 
ruling bloc, without the cooperation of the subaltern groups. His 
message seems to be that it is only by seeing the seeds of 
mummification in the everyday shortcomings of potentially 
transformative agency, that we can conceptualize the potentiality 
for resistance and emancipation.  
Jackson’s chapter provides us with great insights on the relation 
between people’s everyday praxis and capital’s continuity. Yet, these 
are ultimately neutralized by his references to the ways in which the 
emancipatory struggles are impeded by forms of oppression from 
above. This ambiguity, which runs through the majority of the 
collection, I think, also explains the discrepancies between 




4. A Gramscian moment in IPE? 
As emphasized in the previous section, the relation between the 
need for the subalterns to seek emancipation and the possibility of 
the ruling classes to resist them, although certainly present, remains 
underdeveloped throughout the collection. Perhaps as a 
consequence of this, applications of Gramsci’s thought to 
international political economy seem at times to contradict the 
fruitful insights analysed in section 2. For example, Watcharabon 
Buddharaksa refers to the dialectical relation between the “coercive 
practices” of the political society and the hegemony present within 
what Gramsci calls “civil society” (p. 58). Yet, the empirical analysis 
that he puts forward does not really elaborate on how we should 
understand such relation. It is, in fact, surprising that the 
overwhelming reference to coercive mechanisms of the Thai state 
that we find within the chapter is coupled with the recognition that 
“the alternative/critical/challenging social forces which have been 
growing, are still neither mature nor critical enough to contest the 
traditional mode of thought/conception of the world; they are also 
not sufficient to construct a whole new democratic historical bloc 
at this historical stage” (p. 59-60).  
 
 





The fact that hegemony is always working behind dominance 
could have also been more coherently integrated in Fusaro’s 
account on the world order. In his conclusion, in fact, he argues 
that US international hegemony was developed already in the inter-
war period “with the qualification that the latter form of hegemony 
was deficient: while backed by the state strictu sensu, hegemony was 
exercised via private channels rather than public ones and took 
mainly an economic dimension” (p. 372). In more general terms, he 
adds: “As a result of the ‘endless accumulation of capital’ and 
capital’s drive to expand beyond its borders, nation-states are 
compelled to become hegemonic in order to secure the 
accumulation and reproduction of ‘their’ capitals” (p. 373). It is 
clear that, in contrast with what Fusaro himself argued against 
Arrighi, the hegemonic process is here seen only as inserted within 
the process of capital accumulation, in this sense leaving 
unexplored the manners in which capitalism can be contested, let 
alone the relation between capitalist development and its potentially 
contested nature.  
Similar considerations could be applied to Roberto Roccu’s 
chapter. He presents two alternative theories that can explain the 
politics of neoliberalism in general, and then test their validity in 
reference to the neoliberalization process in Egypt. On the one 
hand, Gramsci’s notion of “passive revolution” depends on “a 
dominant class that fails to be hegemonic and subaltern classes that 
lack ‘the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness and organization’ 
required for successfully challenging the dominant classes” (p.28). 
On the other hand, and this is the notion that Roccu believes best 
fits the Egyptian case (even though an in-depth theorization is not 
provided in the chapter), “counterrevolution” (or counter-
reformation, in Gramscian terms) represents a “revolution against 
the revolution” (p. 41). Leaving aside the cogency of such concepts 
to describe recent Egyptian history, the distinction between 
“passive revolution” and “counterrevolution”, thus conceptualized, 
is emblematic from the standpoint of Marxist and Gramscian 
scholarship. In fact, while the former describes a situation, in which 
oppositional and ruling groups are equally weak, the latter describes 
a scenario in which they are both strong and organized. This 
negates the idea that the position of the ruling classes are 
dialectically related to that of the subaltern ones. In other words, 
 
 





the weakness of potentially opposing forces is not conceptualized 
as reinforcing the ruling bloc. And, conversely, the increasing 
organization and cohesiveness of the subalterns does not 
necessarily mean a weakening of the ruling classes’ potential to 
respond to them. Connected to this, Roccu seems to imply that in 
both cases the ruling classes have at their disposal the possibility to 
“render the subaltern classes ‘passive’” (p. 29) or to counter their 
upheaval. Very telling is the fact that in both Fusaro’s and Roccu’s 
chapters – despite the theoretical references to the role of consent 
(p. 370) and the lack of self-awareness of the subaltern classes (p. 
28) – the empirical analyses of the world order and the Egyptian 
case hardly ever refer to the strengths and weaknesses of subaltern 
classes and potentially opposing groups.4  
 
 
5. On (passive) revolution 
As I have highlighted in this review, the collection convincingly 
puts forward a discussion on Gramsci’s revolutionary thought, 
pointing out how this is mainly concerned with the emancipation of 
the subaltern groups. In addition, and in a very original manner, the 
occasional and disorganized consciousness of subordinated classes 
is often seen as something that can end up producing their passivity 
and ultimately lead them to defeat. Yet, at least as frequent seems 
the appeal to arguments that reject such a position, highlighting 
ruling classes’ impositions as the ultimate explanatory tool for 
capitalist continuity. I have argued that while the former approach 
could represent a very timely contribution to Gramscian and 
Marxist debates, the latter leads us towards an ambiguous theory of 
socio-historical change that deeply contrasts with Gramsci’s own 
position. One is reminded of the concept of passive revolution, 
which in Gramsci’s words, “presupposes, and indeed postulates as 
necessary, a vigorous antithesis which can present intransigently all 
its potentiality for development” (Q15§62, p. 1827; cf. SPN p. 
114).5 Digging deeper in Gramsci’s categories, we could argue that 
the coerciveness of capital restructuring would not be possible if it 
 
4 An exception being a very brief remark in Roccu’s chapter (p. 37). 
5 For a more thorough engagement with Gramsci’s notion of passive revolution, see Fifi 2019.  
 
 





was not for the fragmentation (being that cultural or organizational) 
of potentially revolutionary social groups.  
Some of the aspects of the collection that point in the direction 
of dialectically relating subaltern passivity with ruling classes’ 
dominance, I believe, could thus be further emphasized and 
perhaps should lead wider scholarship on Marxism to a rethinking 
of key conceptual and analytical categories. In particular, more 
empirical attention should be directed towards the specific ways in 
which the subaltern classes (through their passivity, common sense, 
etc.) tend to reinforce and make possible ruling class’ hegemony. In 
this sense, Meret’s chapter offers the richest insights in the whole 
volume. She uses a framework borrowed by Gramsci’s reflection on 
the role of the factory councils to understand both the strengths 
and the weaknesses of the refugee-led group Lampedusa in Hamburg 
(LiHH). Perhaps a good idea would be to extend some of the 
questions Meret poses in regards to refugees’ struggles to wider 
enquiries concerning subordinated classes: How can the emergence 
of movements/parties/groups be explained? What are their claims 
and demands? What are their patterns of subjectivization, alliance 
formation, solidarity and community building? How, lastly, can they 
be supported and encouraged? (p. 212). This in turn would also 
provide critical scholars with a better understanding of the relation 
between the strengths and weaknesses of potentially opposing 
groups and the ability of the ruling bloc to respond and subjugate 
the subalterns.6  
In conclusion, Gramsci’s writings dispute the view according to 
which, as eloquently synthesized by Vandeviver, 
 
[p]ower is seen as nomothetic, unstoppable in the growth of its domination 
and ultimately irresistible because it exhausts all human activity, dismisses 
individual human agency, and empties out resistance as well as the production 
of counter-discursive knowledge (p. 249). 
 
For this reason, Gramsci’s oeuvre should be explored also, if not 
mainly, in order to identify those forms of praxis that end up 
reinforcing capitalist domination and, conversely, those that can 
produce forms of emancipation for the subalterns. Whilst the 
 
6 Attempts to apply a Gramscian framework to such studies, can be found for example in Cox 
2018 and Green 2015. 
 
 





collection, as well as the long-term engagement of the authors with 
Gramsci’s thought, provides good insights on the ways to approach 
such riddle; the need for a more universal theory seems to be as 
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